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Mitchell v. State, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 107 (Dec. 21, 2006) 1
CRIMINAL LAW—HABEAS CORPUS
Summary
Appeal from the denial of a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a
criminal case.
Disposition/Outcome
Affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's order dismissing appellant’s
petition. The court remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate appellant’s
conviction for attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon.
Factual and Procedural History
In 1993, four men, including appellant Johnnie Mitchell, participated in the armed
robbery of a casino. The men were inside the casino when Keel, an unarmed security guard,
asked them for identification because he thought they looked underage. Keel began escorting the
men out of the casino when they failed to produce identification.
Smith was one of the four men. As they were walking, Smith pulled a gun and pointed it
at Keel’s head. A struggle ensued when Keel attempted to grab the weapon from Smith. During
the struggle, Smith was shot in the leg and fell to the ground. Keel dropped his radio during the
struggle and ran toward the security office to get another radio. Smith fired two shots at Keel,
but neither shot struck him.
Meanwhile, two of the four men jumped into the casino’s cashier counter and took
money from the cash registers. At least one of the two men was armed. The fourth man stayed
outside the cashier’s cage, which one cashier occupied at the time of the robbery. There was
conflicting trial testimony regarding whether Mitchell was the unarmed fourth man, or whether
he was armed and jumped into the cashier cage. After acquiring the money, all four men fled the
scene.
Mitchell was charged with aiding and abetting attempted murder with the use of a deadly
weapon, aiding and abetting robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, burglary while in
possession of a firearm, possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, and conspiracy to commit
robbery. A jury convicted Mitchell of all charges except the charge of possession of a firearm by
an ex-felon.
On direct appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Mitchell’s conviction. 2 Mitchell
then filed a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied.
The state supreme court affirmed the district court’s denial of that petition. 3 Mitchell then came
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before the state supreme court on appeal of the district court’s dismissal of his second postconviction for a writ of habeas corpus.
Mitchell argued that the district court erred in rejecting claims presented in his postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Mitchell alleged, in part, that his conviction for
attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon as an aider and abettor should be vacated in
light of the court’s decision in Sharma v. State, 4 which was issued after Mitchell’s conviction
became final. The court considered as a matter of first impression whether Sharma applied to
convictions that became final before the court decided Sharma.
Discussion
Mitchell filed an untimely petition more than five years after the court issued a remitter in
his direct appeal. The petition was also successive because Mitchell had already sought relief for
a writ of habeas corpus. Further, the elapsed time between Mitchell’s conviction and the filing
of his petition presumably prejudiced the State in its ability to conduct a retrial.
However, the court recognized that Mitchell could demonstrate a fundamental injustice
sufficient to overcome the procedural bars to the untimely or successive petition because he was
actually innocent of aiding or abetting attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon.
Attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon
Mitchell claimed that his conviction of aiding or abetting attempted murder was improper
because he did not have the specific intent that Keel be killed and thus was actually innocent of
the charge. Mitchell had already raised this argument on direct appeal, therefore making that
decision the law of the case. However, Sharma specifically overruled the decision in Mitchell’s
direct appeal. Therefore, the court declined to apply the law of the case doctrine to Mitchell’s
attempted murder claim because it would have been unfair to apply the law to Mitchell’s case
when it had already been expressly overruled.
The court noted that Nevada’s aiding and abetting statute 5 does not specify what mental
state is required to be convicted as an aider and abettor. However, the court looked at two
Nevada cases 6 and concluded that Mitchell could have only been guilty of attempted murder if
he specifically intended to aid Smith in killing Keel and if he specifically intended that Keel be
killed.
Nevertheless, the court adopted the “natural and probable consequences” doctrine in
deciding Mitchell’s direct appeal and held that “a conviction for attempted murder will lie even
if the defendant did not have the specific intent to kill provided the attempted murder was the
natural and probable consequence of the aider and abettor’s target crime.” 7 However, four years
later the court specifically “disapproved and overruled” Mitchell in Sharma to the extent it
endorsed the natural and probable consequences doctrine. 8
The court agreed that Mitchell was entitled to the vacatur of his attempted murder
conviction pursuant to Sharma if the decision applied retroactively to cases that were final when
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the court decided Sharma. The court began by looking at whether Sharma announced a new rule
or merely clarified the law, which the court assessed using the guidelines set forth in Colwell v.
State. 9 The court concluded that Sharma was a clarification of the law, not a new rule, and
therefore applied to Mitchell.
Accordingly, the court held that under Sharma, the jury should not have convicted
Mitchell of attempted murder as an aider or abettor unless he, not just Smith, had the specific
intent that Keel be killed. In its closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor acknowledged that
Mitchell did not have the specific intent to kill. Therefore, the court concluded that Mitchell was
actually innocent of attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon and thus vacated his
conviction of that charge.
Deadly weapon enhancement to the robbery charge
Although Mitchell claimed he was actually innocent of the weapon enhancement to the
robbery charge, the court noted that Mitchell failed to demonstrate that its prior holding
affirming the charge was clearly erroneous. Unlike Mitchell’s attempted murder claim, Sharma
had no bearing on the prior holding regarding this charge. Thus, the court concluded the claim
was barred.
Sua sponte jury instruction
Mitchell also claimed the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte give a jury instruction
defining the “use” of a deadly weapon. However, the court concluded that Mitchell waived this
claim by failing to argue it in his direct appeal. Furthermore, he failed to demonstrate just cause
and prejudice sufficient to overcome this waiver.
Concurrence/Dissent
BECKER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Justice Becker concurred with the majority’s holding that Sharma represented a
clarification of the law and therefore applied retroactively. Becker also concurred that Mitchell
did not intend to aid and abet in a murder or attempted murder so the court was correct in
vacating his conviction for attempted murder.
However, Justice Becker dissented from the language in the opinion that suggested one
must have the specific intent to kill, rather than the language from Sharma wherein one must
have the specific intent to aid and abet in the crime.
Conclusion
The court concluded that Sharma clarified the law and therefore applied retroactively to
cases that were final before the court decided it. The court also found that the holding in Sharma
required the court to vacate Mitchell’s conviction for attempted murder with the use of a deadly
weapon, in light of the State’s concession at trial that Mitchell lacked the specific intent to kill.
Further, the court concluded that Mitchell’s claim that he was actually innocent of the deadly
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weapon enhancement to the robbery conviction was barred by the law of the case and his claim
that the district court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on the definition of the use of
a deadly weapon is procedurally barred. Therefore, the court affirmed in part and reversed in
part the district court’s order dismissing Mitchell’s petition, and remanded to the district court
with instructions to vacate Mitchell’s conviction for attempted murder with the use of a deadly
weapon.
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